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Human security benchmarks: Governing
human wellbeing at a distance
ALEXANDRA HOMOLAR*
Abstract. When the United Nations Development Programme formally introduced the concept
of human security in 1994, it was widely celebrated as a long-overdue humanist alternative to
orthodox models of security. Today, human security is a buzzword for describing the complex
challenges that individuals and communities face in achieving safety and wellbeing in an
insecure world. This article directs attention away from the emancipatory and empowering quali-
ties commonly ascribed to human security to explore, instead, the speciﬁc role of benchmarking
within the wider human security agenda. The main focus here is on the ways in which human
life has been operationalised, measured, and classiﬁed to create indicators that permit judgements
about individual security and insecurity. The article argues that although a single global human
security benchmark has yet to be established, the main indices used as performance metrics of
human insecurity have produced a narrow understanding of what it means to live a ‘secure’ life
and have reinforced the state as the main focal point of international security governance.
Dr Alexandra Homolar is Associate Professor of International Security in the Department of
Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick and is Principal Investigator
on the ‘Enemy Addiction’ Research Project, funded by a three-year ESRC Future Research
Leaders Fellowship. Prior to joining Warwick, Alexandra held research positions at Yale
University, Johns Hopkins University, and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. Her work
has been published in journals such as the European Journal of International Relations, Journal
of Strategic Studies, Review of International Political Economy, and Critical Discourse Studies.
So we rely on statistics in order to build and maintain our own model of the world.
Dudley Seers (1983)1
For as long as we are unable to put our arguments into ﬁgures, the voice of our science … will
never be heard by practical men.
J. A. Schumpeter (1933), p. 12.2
Introduction
In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development
Report3 (HDR) made a major contribution to reshaping the international security
* This article beneﬁtted from insightful comments by three anonymous reviewers, André Broome and
Joel Quirk, and the participants of the Benchmarking in Global Governance (BiGG) Workshop held at
the University of Warwick 12–14 March 2014. Any omissions or errors remain the author’s own
responsibility. The research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number
ES/K008684/1).
1 Dudley Sears, The Political Economy of Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 130.
2 Joseph Schumpeter, ‘The common sense of econometrics’, Econometrica, 1:1 (1933), pp. 5–12 (p. 12).
3 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report (HDR) 1994 (New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), available at: {http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ﬁles/reports/255/
hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf} accessed 5 August 2014.
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agenda of the ‘New World Order’. The document offered a clear vision of how the
people-centric concept of ‘human security’ should replace the traditional focus on
conﬂict between states, the protection of state borders, and military solutions to security
problems. Human security was envisioned as an all-encompassing emancipatory
concept that could help to address the many causes of human vulnerability across the
globe, including violent conﬂict, resource deprivation, human rights violations, and
environmental change. For many observers and practitioners of global politics, the
notion of human security held the promise of a new normative order that could
transcend the ideological straitjacket and state-centric orientation of the Cold War
international system.4
Despite ongoing debates over the meaning, scope, and utility of the concept,5 the
idea of human security has since been widely celebrated as offering a long-overdue
humanist alternative to traditional security governance with the potential to both
empower and protect individuals.6 Critics, however, have pointed to the orthodox
qualities of the concept and sought to raise awareness of the counterproductive
practical effects of the human security agenda.7 The downsides identiﬁed here include
the securitisation of everyday life, as well as the norms, power relations, and
universalising claims that human security both contains and promotes.8 As such
scholarship has shown, the emancipatory qualities commonly ascribed to the concept
of human security cannot simply be accepted at face value.9 It is within this context
that this article contributes to the debates on what human security does.
Speciﬁcally, the article interrogates the process of translating the abstract notion of
human security into concrete measures of a liveable life, which lies at the centre of
making judgments about the state of human security. Contemporary political and
academic debates have already begun to shine the spotlight on how the concept could
and should be operationalised to quantify its multiple dimensions of insecurity
4 Roland Paris, ‘Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air?’, International Security, 26:2 (2001), pp. 87–102;
Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, ‘The second generation of human security: Lessons from the UN and EU
experience, International Affairs, 86:1 (2010), pp. 211–24.
5 See, for example, Nicholas Thomas and William T. Tow, ‘The utility of human security: Sovereignty and
humanitarian intervention’, Security Dialogue, 33:2 (2002), pp. 177–92; Alexander J. Bellamy and Matt
McDonald, ‘The utility of human security: Which humans? What security? A reply to Thomas and Tow’,
Security Dialogue, 33:3 (2002), pp. 373–77; Edward Newman, ‘Critical human security studies’, Review of
International Studies, 36:1 (2010), pp. 77–94; J. Peter Burgess, ‘The ethical challenges of human security
in the age of globalization’, in Mouﬁda Goucha and John Crowley (eds), Rethinking Human Security
(Chichester: Wiley Blackwell and UNCESCO, 2008); Ralph Pettman, ‘Human security as global security:
Reconceptualizing strategic studies’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 18:1 (2005), pp. 137–50.;
Astri Suhrke, ‘Human security and the interests of states’, Security Dialogue, 30:4 (1999), pp. 265–76;
P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, ‘Why human security?’, Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International
Relations VII: Winter/Spring (2006), pp. 137–55.
6 Keith Krause, ‘Building the agenda of human security: Policy and practice within the human security
network’, International Social Science Journal, 59:1 (2008), pp. 65–79 (p. 78).
7 Nik Hynek and David Chandler, ‘Introduction: Emancipation and power in human security’, in David
Chandler and Nik Marhia (eds), Critical Perspectives on Human Security: Rethinking Emancipation and
Power in International Relations (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), pp. 1–10.
8 See Ryerson Christie, ‘Critical voices and human security: To endure, to engage or to critique?’, Security
Dialogue, 41:2 (2010), pp. 169–90; Tara McCormack, ‘Human security and the separation of security and
development’, Conﬂict, Security and Development, 11:2 (2011), pp. 235–60. On human security as
‘relation of governance’ and as ‘principle of formation’ see Mark Dufﬁeld and Nicholas Waddell,
‘Securing humans in a dangerous world’, International Politics, 43:1 (2006), pp. 1–23; Kyle Grayson,
‘Human security as power/knowledge: the biopolitics of a deﬁnitional debate’, Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, 21:3 (2008), pp. 383–401.
9 See Tara McCormack, ‘The limits to emancipation in the human security framework’, in Chandler and
Hyrek (eds), Critical Perspectives, pp. 99–113; see also David Roberts, ‘Human security, biopoverty and
the possibility for emancipation’, in Chandler and Hyrek (eds), Critical Perspectives, pp. 69–82.
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and threat.10 This article both contributes to and goes beyond such considerations as
it zooms in on the normative assumptions about the core ingredients for a ‘liveable
life’, upon which any attempt to measure human security is implicitly based. In
particular, it explores the process of normalising and essentialising human existence
through the lens of global benchmarking practices, which has thus far been sidelined
in the discussions over the utility and impact of the human security agenda.
As the editors of this Special Issue highlight, global benchmarks have emerged as a
key tool ‘for extending public and private authority over distant entities’.11 The
practice of benchmarking human security converts controversial international
development and security policy agendas, complex social phenomena at the
domestic level, and normative concepts about human progress into a legible and
technocratic terminology that does not reﬂect their intense contestation. The
benchmarking process entails two main steps. In the ﬁrst step, the concept of
human security is disaggregated into distinct categories and indicators that enable the
ordinal representation of its complex constituent parts. In the second step, universal
standards are constructed and applied to human security indicators to enable the
comparative analysis and assessment of human vulnerability across issue areas in
numerous countries over time.
The article is structured into two main parts that reﬂect the process of human
security benchmarking. Part one critically discusses this process of operationalising
human security with a primary focus on unpacking the indicators used in the 1994
HDR. While the Report is commonly associated with the launch of the human
security framework, there has been less appreciation of how it also established and
promoted a global agenda for how we map and measure people’s living conditions
and through what categories. Part two of the article shows that while thinking about
human security has generally moved beyond the 1994 HDR, the indicators contained
in the Report have continued to inform the practice of benchmarking of human
security. Given the current lack of a global ‘gold standard’ in human security
performance metrics and index rankings, the focus here is on a set of seemingly
disparate indexes, which tend to be discussed in isolation: the Fragile State Index,
Freedom in the World, and the Human Development Index. Although they may not
intuitively reﬂect human security priorities, collectively these indices have provided
global governance actors with established datasets, categories, and benchmarks to
both judge the state of human security in the world and reinforce the standards
constructed to achieve human security. The conclusion underscores the key ﬁnding
that how human life has been operationalised, measured, and classiﬁed in the practice
of benchmarking human security is at variance with the emancipatory political
rhetoric commonly associated with human security discourses and policies. The main
argument of the article is that human security benchmarking has been heavily
implicated in the normalisation of controversial policy goals and the promotion
of a one-size-ﬁts-all approach to securing humans, which reinforces the state’s
responsibility for security, rather than challenging or supplanting it.12
10 See Kyle Grayson, ‘Human security as power/knowledge’, p. 384; Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, ‘The
second generation’; Kirsti Stuvøy, ‘Human security research practices: Conceptualizing security for
women’s crisis centres in Russia’, Security Dialogue, 41:3 (2010), pp. 279–99.
11 André Broome and Joel Quirk, ‘Governing the world at a distance: the practice of global benchmarking’,
Review of International Studies, 41:5 (2015), pp. 819–41.
12 Natasha Marhia, ‘Some humans are more human than others: Troubling the “human” in human security
from a critical feminist perspective’, Security Dialogue, 44:1 (2013), pp. 19–23 (p. 23).
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The politics of indicators and the human security agenda
Global humanitarian governance is typically couched in universalising terms. It is
presented as an ‘inherently progressive project’ that strives towards ‘enacting and
creating a world deﬁned by the values of humanity’, one that is centred on protecting
and improving the lives of the vulnerable.13 But any attempt at ‘saving strangers’14 ﬁrst
requires the identiﬁcation of who is vulnerable and to what; it requires an ability to
observe and compare individual experiences of insecurity across multiple social and
institutional contexts. Much of contemporary global humanitarian governance relies on
a diverse collection of indicators to identify areas of greatest need. These indicators – and
the indices and benchmarks that are based on them – serve as proxy measures for the
state of the human condition.15
Indicators are always constructed and selected based upon a priori conceptions of
which observable properties correspond with the phenomenon that is to be captured
in a simpliﬁed and measurable way.16 They never exist in a sociopolitical vacuum, as
neutral attributes that stand ready to represent speciﬁc social phenomena as data and
measurements. Human security is no exception. As the following discussion shows,
the process of translating the concept of human security into a series of tangible,
measurable objects (‘reiﬁcation’) relies on operationalising normative assumptions
about what constitutes ‘liveable’ human existence into observable and measurable
categories. The indicators chosen to make judgements about the state of human
security thereby function to both concretise and reproduce abstract ideas about what
constitutes a ‘secure’ human life.
Delineating human (in)security in the 1994 Human Development Report
The release of policy reports by international actors occasionally has signiﬁcant
effects on the evolution of global policy agendas. Prominent examples include the
World Bank’s 1993 report The East Asian Miracle and the 2006 Stern Review
commissioned for the UK government on The Economics of Climate Change. Few
publications have had an impact as far-reaching and enduring as the 1994 Human
Development Report New Dimensions of Human Security. The document gained its
landmark status by ofﬁcially introducing the notion of human security to the global
policy community. While the concept of human security had been articulated
earlier at the North-South Roundtable ‘Economics of Peace’ in Costa Rica in
January 1990 and also was included in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace,17 the
13 Michael N. Barnett, ‘Humanitarian governance’, Annual Review of Political Science, 16:1 (2013),
pp. 379–98 (pp. 381, 383). See also Didier Fassin, ‘Humanitarianism: a nongovernmental government’, in
Michel Feher (ed.), Nongovernmental Politics (New York: Zone Books, 2007), pp. 149–60 (p. 151).
14 Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002).
15 See J. David Singer, ‘Variables, indicators, and data: the measurement problem in macropolitical
research’, Social Science History, 6:2 (1982), pp. 181–217 (p. 186); also UNDP, HDR 1994, p. 3.
16 Russel Lawrence Barsh, ‘Measuring human rights: Problems of methodology and purpose’, Human
Rights Quarterly, 15:1 (1993), pp. 87–121 (pp. 91, 95–6); Ray Pawson, A Measure for Measures; A
Manifesto for Empirical Sociology (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 40. As Singer (‘Variables’, p. 186) put
it, ‘we think and theorize in terms of concepts, and our data serve as convenient surrogates that represent
them and can be subjected to statistical analysis’.
17 ‘Economics of Peace: A Summary of the North South Roundtable Session in San Jose’, Costa Rica,
4–5 January 1990, available at: {http://ns-rt.org/reports/ECONOMICS%20OF%20PEACE.pdf} accessed
12 September 2014; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary-General’
(UN Security Council, 1992), available at: {www.unrol.org/ﬁles/A_47_277.pdf} accessed 25 August 2014
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terminology did not gain traction in the wider public discourse until after the launch
of the 1994 HDR.18
The pivotal document disaggregated human security into seven interlinked
composite parts: economic security, food security, health security, environmental
security, personal security, community security, and political security. Intimately
connected to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and radically departing
from economic interpretations of the human condition, the 1994 HDR put forward
a multidimensional conceptualisation of human security aimed at providing a
holistic approach to help pinpoint the greatest areas and sites of individual
vulnerability. However, a key prerequisite to mapping the state of human security
is the availability of a clear set of guidelines on what precisely the seven categories of
human security contain, and what the major signposts are for ‘insecurity’ in each.
Given its aim to address the ‘growing challenge’ of human security through a new,
people-centric paradigm that could shift the focus of security from the state to the
‘legitimate concerns of ordinary people’ and ‘daily lives’, we might expect the Report
to engage in a ‘pro-people’ operationalisation of human security.19 But this was
not the case.
The Report set out to highlight that since the end of the Second World War,
humanity had progressed ‘on several critical fronts’ relevant to human security and
afﬁrmed a belief in the possibility to engineer further positive change.20 It drew
speciﬁc attention to the areas of liberty, self-determination, development, healthcare,
and economic wellbeing. These were presented as universal values, despite their
longstanding liberal heritage.21 In order to illustrate the notion of ‘human advance’,
the Report relied on established global comparative measures that conceptually
privileged the state rather than individuals and their speciﬁc living conditions. For
example, the evidence offered in support of human advance included the increase in
the number of free countries following the end of the Colonial era, the steady rise in
national wealth levels, and a decline in military expenditures after the mid-1980s, as
well as an increase in the number of pluralistic and democratic regimes.22
This emphasis upon the state as a key reference point for understanding human
progress diminished the extent to which it was possible to move beyond a statist bias
from the outset. Moreover, the reliance on the state as the primary unit of analysis
continued throughout the diagnosis of human vulnerability across the seven
categories of human security. A notable example is ‘economic security’, which
featured prominently in the 1994 HDR. While remaining elusive when it comes to a
precise deﬁnition of economic security, the Report speciﬁed that ‘an assured basic
income’ should form the core requirement to be achieved – rather than simply growth
in economic output.23 Human vulnerability in this area was equated with income
insecurity, which was further disaggregated into the notions of insecure working
conditions, underemployment, the decreasing value of nominal wages, and the lack of
(para. 16); see also the UNDP, Human Development Report (HDR) 1993 (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993), p. iii, available at: {http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ﬁles/reports/222/
hdr_1993_en_complete_nostats.pdf} accessed 12 September 2014.
18 This is based on a Factiva search of major English language print media for the phrase ‘human security’
from January 1990 to September 2014.
19 UNDP, HDR 1994, pp. 4, 22.
20 Ibid., p. 1.
21 On development as norm, see David Williams, International Development and Global Politics: History,
Theory, and Practice (Abington: Routledge, 2012).
22 UNDP, HDR 1994, pp.1–2.
23 Ibid., p. 24.
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social security as important markers.24 Despite extensive discussion of the economic
security category, there was little attempt to operationalise a multifaceted
understanding of income insecurity into measurable phenomena. ‘Data limitations’
were cited as the main obstacle to the conversion of the different constituent elements
of income insecurity into a set of measurable economic security indicators applicable
to all countries.25 In order to make quantiﬁed inferences about individual economic
wellbeing, the Report instead reverted back to the use of readily available national
aggregate data as a proxy for economic security. This included a particular emphasis
upon Gross National Product (GNP) per capita for developing countries and
unemployment rates for industrial countries.26
Even if these two measures could accurately represent comparable indicators of
aggregate economic conditions across different societies, they are nonetheless highly
problematic for making judgements about the economic dimension of human
security. This is because they draw upon datasets developed for a different purpose:
they assess national economic performance rather than individual economic security.
GNP per capita represents the average annual earnings per person as the average total
value of all goods and services produced by a country in one year divided by the size
of its population. The unemployment rate, meanwhile, shows the percentage of
unemployed workers in a country as share of its total labour force.27 The two key
indicators utilised to provide an assessment of the state of ‘economic’ human security
therefore lack an intuitive relationship to the core requirement of an assured basic
income. Moreover, it remains unclear how national economic performance metrics
correspond with a people-centric understanding of individual economic security, even
for the datasets used. Another fundamental problem, with far-reaching political
implications, is the ambiguity of the scale of measurement; that is, the failure to
clearly identify the threshold between economic security and economic insecurity.28
Each of the components of the human security framework presented in the 1994
HDR suffered from a similar vagueness in relation to conceptualisation and
operationalisation. In addition, many of the indicators selected were based on
unexplained and value-laden assumptions about what factors are important in
making individuals ‘secure’ across the different core categories of human security –
which essential ingredients add up to a ‘liveable life’. This was particularly
problematic in the Report’s human development priority of health security.29
Health security was deﬁned as the ability of individuals, communities, and
societies to avoid premature death. Key sources of health insecurity in developing
countries were identiﬁed as common infectious and parasitic diseases, such as those
linked to poor nutrition and an unsafe environment. For industrialised countries, in
24 Ibid., pp. 25–6.
25 Ibid., p. 26.
26 Ibid. Since 1993, this has become the Gross National Income (GNI). Calculated in national currency,
and then converted into US$, the GNI is ‘the sum of value added by all resident producers plus
any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary
income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad’. World Bank, ‘GNI per capita,
Atlas method (current US$)’, World Bank Open Data (2013), available at: {http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD} accessed 5 August 2014.
27 The total labour force is deﬁned as the actual number of people available for work, both unemployed and
employed.
28 The Report only notes that 0.1 % of donor countries GNP ‘channelled to the poorest nations… for basic
human development priorities’ could help bring ‘all poor nations up to at least a minimum threshold of
human development’. UNDP, HDR 1994, pp. 4–5.
29 Ibid., pp. 4, 6.
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turn, the main causes noted were cardiovascular diseases and cancer, which were
respectively linked to lifestyle choices and environmental contamination. The
fundamental problem here is that this is not even a comparison between apples and
oranges, but rather between apples and almonds. What is more, as was the case in the
category of economic security, the unit of analysis for the main indicator of health
insecurity is not speciﬁcally concerned with individual wellbeing, but instead focuses
upon aggregate outcomes. The degree of health security is deﬁned in terms of
premature death at the national level by measuring the annual number of deaths
attributed to speciﬁc yet different causes in developed and developing countries. With
respect to attributes with a negative impact on health security at the individual level,
the Report further singled out women and the poor as particularly vulnerable groups
within society, speciﬁcally depicting maternal mortality rates as an important marker
of health security and making an explicit, if unspeciﬁed, causal link between poverty
and ill-health.30
At the heart of the health security section of the Report was the importance of
how well societies are able to both counter the sources of insecurity identiﬁed and deal
with their effects. This reﬂected an assumption that how a society is organised is
causally related to the degree of health security in that society. A higher degree of
health security was linked to a liberal understanding of social welfare provision. To
measure and compare the relationship between the provision of welfare and health
security, the Report listed a range of indicators, which are tied to a set of positions
that tend to be associated with a progressive humanitarian agenda. These indicators
included the ratio of doctors to people within and across countries, national per capita
health spending levels, the percentage of people without health insurance, access to
safe water, and malnutrition levels, as well as access to family planning and home care
during pregnancy and birth.31 This implied an obligation on the state to provide an
environment that fosters equal opportunity for individuals to achieve health security
by protecting them from disease as much as from unhealthy lifestyles, a concept that is
far from being universally accepted. In addition to a paternalistic tendency to shape
and govern peoples’ life choices in a direction compatible with the way in which
health security is deﬁned, the Report failed to bridge the gap between this
universalised conception of an entitlement to good health and the particular and
differentiated needs associated with health problems between and within societies.
Another major problem with the 1994 HDR is that it relied upon tautological
reasoning to provide measurements for speciﬁc indicators in one of the core categories
of human security by utilising a second. Food security, for example, is one of the least-
deﬁned components of human security in the Report. Eliding the difference between
the general availability of food in a country and the ways in which food is spatially
distributed within a given territory, food security is understood as the entitlement of
people to ‘physical and economic access to basic food’.32 This implicitly combines two
distinct factors: (1) an unequal distribution of food and (2) a lack of purchasing
power. The Report used notions of ‘undernourishment’ and ‘born underweight’ as
observable indicators to quantify individuals’ vulnerability in terms of inadequate
access to food, without establishing how these indicators should be measured and
30 Ibid., p. 28.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid., p. 27. The 1994 HDR presents a table on ‘Indicators of food security in selected countries’, which
are based on national aggregate datasets without discussing how they relate to and help to measure
‘access to food’.
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against what standard. Instead, it established a link between ‘access to food’ on the
one hand, and ‘access to assets, employment, and income security’ on the other.33 The
degree of food security is thus at least partially measured by the level of economic
security.
This overview of how the human security agenda was delineated in the 1994
Human Development Report illustrates the conceptual ﬂaws and methodological
problems inherent in how the various categories of human security were disaggregated
and measured. A great deal of ambiguity remains over why these seven core
components are essential to human security, what the relationship is between them,
and how they overlap in terms of their conceptual scope and relevant indicators. And
while the very idea of human security implies that a spectrum of security exists based
on standards that would allow for cross-national comparison – a scale that ranges
from secure to insecure – no attempt was made in the Report to clarify the high/low
values at either end of this spectrum, or the various points that may mark qualitative
differences in levels of human security along it.
Human security and international stability
In the twenty years since its inception, human security has developed into a potent
buzzword for describing the complex challenges that individuals and communities
face in achieving safety and wellbeing in an insecure world. Many international
political actors, in particular from the developed world, have incorporated human
security as part of their mandate and policy agenda. This includes states such as
Norway, Japan, Canada, and EU member states; international organisations such as
the UN and the World Bank; and non-governmental organisations, particularly aid
agencies and human rights organisations.34
Today, human security is both a standard term in the development policy lexicon
and a reference point for a broad understanding of security. It has also has emerged as
a constitutive element of global humanitarian governance. An important factor in the
continuing popularity of the human security concept and associated terminology is a
legacy of how the 1994 HDR secured its meaning, which connected a concern with the
security of individual human beings to questions of international peace and stability.
This discursive link has two key facets.
First, the capability-centric problematisation of individuals’ vulnerability to a
wide range of threats beyond those to their immediate physical safety fused negative
rights (civil and political) and positive rights (economic and social) within a single
meta-concept. Articulated as universally shared concerns irrespective of their
particular normative heritage, the core ingredients to a secure, liveable life for all
people are today presented as critical objectives of – and challenges to – the broader
33 Ibid.
34 Paris, ‘Paradigm shift’; Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, ‘Rethinking human security’, Political
Science Quarterly, 116:4 (2001), pp. 585–610 (p. 589); Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss,
Humanitarianism Contested: Where Angels Fear to Tread (London: Routledge, 2011), pp. 26–9; cf.
OECD, Conﬂict, Peace and Development Co-Operation on the Threshold of the 21st Century (Paris:
OECD, 1997), available at: {http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pcaaa817.pdf} accessed 5 August 2014;
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), ‘Report: The Responsibility to
Protect’ (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), available at: {http://responsibility
toprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf} accessed 5 August 2014); Commission on Human Security, ‘Final
Report: Human Security Now’, available at: {http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ﬁles/resources/
91BAEEDBA50C6907C1256D19006A9353-chs-security-may03.pdf} accessed 5 August 2014.
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international security agenda. They include universal primary education, literacy
(in particular for women), access to primary health care and immunisation, freedom
from discrimination, and access to food and family planning services, as well as safe
drinking water, sanitation, and credit.35 The emphasis on human security deﬁned in
terms of a ‘universalism of life claims’ speaks to the empowerment of people across
the globe and the promotion of a wide range of positive and negative rights as basic
human rights.36
The 1994 HDR offered only minimal insights into how the state of human
(in)security can be measured, and what the threshold is between security and
insecurity. Yet the indicators developed in the Report have helped to secure and
reproduce a very speciﬁc meaning of ‘the vital core’ of human life within global
humanitarian discourse and the wider international security agenda.37 In the context
of the metaphorical Global War on Terror, this liberal humanist-inspired construction
of what makes a life worthy and ‘liveable’ beyond mere biological existence has
gained rather than lost momentum.38
Second, 1994 HDR focused less on capturing how secure or insecure individual
human beings are, and more on how well states perform according to the standard of
human security. Concentrating attention on states’ willingness and capacities to
provide equal footing for individuals’ life chances as well as to protect both human
rights and the general quality of life opened the door for judgements about the
condition of human security to be judgements levelled against particular states. The
focus on ‘good governance’ across the different components of human security has
both deﬁned the core zones for political action and served to reconﬁgure the meaning
of the state within the fabric of international security.39 No longer is the state
primarily seen as the principal referent of security, but it is also understood as the core
provider and arbitrator of human security.
The shift of the human security agenda away from making inferences about levels
of individual human vulnerability also helped to carve out new areas of responsibility
for legitimate statehood. This marked a major steppingstone towards the emerging
norm of conditional sovereignty, which is the idea that the right of states to be
recognised as sovereign actors in the international arena without being subject to
external interference is tied to their ability and willingness to protect their own
population from harm.40 The extent of this responsibility has remained a matter
of debate – as has the point at which the international community should act
on behalf of those affected.41 Nonetheless, the radical departure from treating
human insecurity as detached from recognised statehood has risen to prominence
35 This is summarised in the ‘20:20 Compact for Human Development’. UNDP, HDR 1994, pp. 7–8; see
also Liam Clegg, ‘Benchmarking and blame games: Exploring the contestation of the Millennium
Development Goals’, Review of International Studies, 41:5 (2015), pp. 947–67.
36 Ibid., pp. 13–14; also Des Gasper, ‘Securing humanity: Situating “human security” as concept and
discourse’, Journal of Human Development, 6:2 (2005), pp. 221–45.
37 On the ‘vital core’ of human life see Sabina Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security
(Oxford: Centre for Research on Inequality, CRISE, 2003).
38 See Marhia, ‘Some humans are more human’, pp. 21–3, 28; Michael Dillon ‘Governing terror: the state
of emergency of biopolitical emergence’, International Political Sociology, 1:1 (2007), pp. 7–28.
39 See also James Harrison and Sharifah Sekalala, ‘Addressing the compliance gap? UN initiatives to
benchmark the human rights performance of states and corporations’, Review of International Studies,
41:5 (2015), pp. 925–45. Clegg, ‘Benchmarking global development’.
40 Alexandra Homolar, ‘Rebels without a conscience: the evolution of the rogue states narrative in US
security policy’, European Journal of International Relations, 17:4 (2011), pp. 705–27.
41 See, for example, Alexander Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect – ﬁve years on’, Ethics & International
Affairs, 24:2 (2010), pp. 143–69.
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in the post-9/11 era.42 In contemporary international security and development
discourses, the ability of the state to foster human capabilities and to provide a
sociopolitical environment conducive to ‘human security’ is widely seen as a necessary
function of a civilised society and increasingly sets the boundaries of political
possibility for interventions by international actors.
The scholarly and policy debates over the utility and scope of the concept of
human security continue to evolve.43 Nonetheless, the human security indicators set
out in the 1994 HDR, however vague, have served to reﬂect, substantiate, and
reproduce the foundational norms of an international order that is centred on a liberal
humanist notion of progress and which emphasises self-determination, representative
government, and economic wellbeing. They have helped to translate abstract
normative conceptions of what a liveable life entails and what the responsibilities
of the state should be within this framework into concrete, even actionable, categories.
Despite its various shortcomings, 1994 HDR thus played a pivotal role in the
normative reconstruction of the post-Cold War international order. By shaping how
we categorise and measure human security, the landmark report altered how we
interpret and evaluate the success and failure of domestic and international
practices.44 As we shall see, this continues to reverberate in contemporary global
benchmarking.
Benchmarking human (in)security through global indices
Global indices provide international actors with a powerful political weapon to rate
and rank different countries in a systematic and comparative fashion, in order to
establish how well they perform against predeﬁned targets and to promote related
policy agendas.45 Indices are aggregations of a range of different indicators, each
derived from a series of observed values that have been placed on a speciﬁc scale of
measurement to enable a comparative analysis.46 They are intended to monitor
42 The universalism entails here ‘respecting national sovereignty but only as long as nation-states respect the
human rights of their own people’. UNDP, HDR 1994, p. 14. On human security and conditional
sovereignty see Miguel De Larrinaga and Marc G. Doucet, ‘Sovereign power and the biopolitics of
human security’, Security Dialogue, 39:5 (2008), pp. 517–37 (pp. 525–8).
43 See, for example, the debates between the ‘broad school’, which advances joining together human
physical safety, human dignity, and human development, and the ‘narrow school’, which focuses on
individuals’ safety from violent conﬂicts and has received a boost after the ICISS publication, The
Responsibility to Protect. See Caroline Thomas, ‘Global governance, development and human security:
Exploring the links’, Third World Quarterly, 22:2 (2001), pp. 159–75; Bellamy and McDonald, ‘The
utility of human security’; P. H. Liotta and Taylor Owen, ‘Sense and symbolism: Europe takes on human
security’, Parameters, 36:3 (2006), pp. 85–102; Suhrke, ‘Human security’; Thomas and Tow, ‘Utility of
human security’; see also the HDR 1994 Special Issue in Contemporary Politics, 21:1 (2015); Mary
Martin and Taylor Owen (eds), Routledge Handbook of Human Security (London: Routledge, 2013).
44 See also Rebecca Adler-Nissen and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Power in practice: Negotiating the international
intervention in Libya’, European Journal of International Relations, 20:4 (2014), pp. 889–911.
45 See Ole Jacob Sending and Jon Harald Sande Lie, ‘The limits of global authority: How the World
Bank benchmarks economies in Ethiopia and Malawi’, Review of International Studies, 41:5 (2015),
pp. 993–1010. Alexander Cooley and Jack Snyder (eds), Ranking the World: Grading States as a Tool of
Global Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Beth A. Simmons and Judith
G. Kelley, ‘Politics by number: Indicators as social pressure in International Relations’, American Journal
of Political Science (forthcoming 2015); Katja Freistein, ‘Effects of indicator use: a comparison of poverty
measuring instruments at the World Bank’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice
(2015, online ﬁrst); Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry, ‘Indicators as technology
of global governance’, Law and Society Review, 46:1 (2012), pp. 71–104.
46 Jack Brand, ‘The politics of social indicators’, The British Journal of Sociology, 26:1 (1975), pp. 78–90
(p. 79).
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complex political, economic, and social phenomena for particular political purposes
by expressing a set of disparate indicators on the basis of a common metric to permit
assessments about conditions and trends.47 As such, they permit the making of
judgements and ultimately benchmark the quality of conduct of a unit of analysis, the
design of institutions, and sociopolitical outcomes through standardised comparative
measures that are linked to speciﬁc reference points.48
Despite frequent references to human security indicators49 and to human security
as a benchmark ‘for an emerging new model of “security”’,50 no consensus has
emerged on how to operationalise the concept or what the standard is for separating
the high-achiever countries in the human security classroom from the under-
performers. While mapping the patterns and trends of human insecurity across the
globe has played a key role in the wider discourse on humanitarian governance in the
international arena, measuring threats to human life and human vulnerability has
thus far been characterised by the lack of a speciﬁc global human security index.51
However, a variety of prominent and well-established global indices, which link to
different dimensions of how human security has been delineated since the 1994 HDR,
have served as tools and reference points for benchmarking human security. These are
typically centred either on states’ capacities to provide an environment that is
conducive to human security, or how well the degree of development in different
countries and regions fosters improvements in human capabilities. The following
discussion of the differences between capacity-benchmarking and capability-
benchmarking illustrates that, although they produce country ratings and rankings
for different purposes, these indices have shaped what are today counted as the key
performance metrics of human security.
Capacity benchmarking: State stability and freedom scores
In response to a spike in intra-state conﬂicts at the beginning of the post-Cold War
era, the problem of what have been variously termed ‘failed’, ‘failing’, and ‘fragile’
states took centre stage on the international security agenda. The 1994 HDR is an
early example of the classiﬁcation of ‘national breakdown’ as one of the main risks to
human security and, by extension, a critical threat to international stability.52
Although both are highly ambiguous concepts, this link between the level of ‘human
47 On this process of commensuration see Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens,
‘Commensuration as a social process’, Annual Review of Sociology, 24 (1998), pp. 313–43 (p. 315); On
commensuration and global benchmarking practices see André Broome and Joel Quirk, ‘Governing the
world at a distance’.
48 See also Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 28, 45; On standards and benchmarking see Kathleen
C. Dominique, Ammar Anees Malik, and Valerie Remoquillo-Jenni, ‘International benchmarking:
Politics and policy’, Science and Public Policy, 40:4 (2013), pp. 504–13.
49 UNESCO-ISS, ‘Final Recommendations of the UNESO-ISS Expert Meeting on Peace, Human Security
and Conﬂict Prevention in Africa’, Proceedings of the UNESCO-ISS Expert Meeting held in Pretoria,
23–4 July 2001, available at: {www.issafrica.org/Pubs/Books/Unesco/FinalRcomm.html} accessed
5 August 2014.
50 Dan Henk, ‘Human security: Relevance and implications’, Parameters, 35:2 (2005), pp. 91–106 (p. 92).
51 Miguel De Larrinaga and Marc G. Doucet, ‘Sovereign power’, p. 528. See the HDI subsection below
for attempts to develop such an index. The datasets and indexes the Human Security Report Project
focuses relate to a narrow understanding of human security, see, for example, Human Security Audit
(2005), available at: {www.hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/HSR2005/2005HumanSecurityReport-Part2-
HumanSecurityAudit.pdf} accessed 7 May 2015.
52 UNDP, HDR 1994, p. 38.
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security’ in a country and the risk of ‘state failure’ gained further momentum in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001.53
State failure, broadly deﬁned as the lack of ‘stateness’, is regarded as a destructive
force for human security because it is equated with the absence of the conditions
established in the wider human security discourse as essential ingredients to normal
statehood and a secure life: reliable rules and physical infrastructure for economic
development and social interaction.54 Some observers go as far as to argue that to
gradually achieve human security in such societies, external ‘statebuilding’
interventions to create a ‘legitimate, professional, and representative state … is the
only way to address the problems of the modern, interconnected world’.55 In
contemporary debates on whether and how to intervene in a sovereign country’s
domestic affairs, the link between individual human wellbeing and the nature of social
organisation at the state level is made explicit through the idea that legitimate
(sovereign) statehood entails both the capacity and responsibility to protect and to
provide for the domestic population. Should a state fail to do so, it is argued, the
international community has a right and a duty to act. In extreme cases, this duty can
include the authorisation of the use of force to ostensibly come to the rescue of the
domestic population as external ‘liberators’.56
Despite the politically contested nature of the concept of state failure, the degree
to which a state is judged to be ‘fragile’ or at risk of ‘collapse’ is generally determined
through an evaluation of the ‘conditions that threaten the physical integrity, welfare,
self-determination, and opportunities’ of individual human beings.57 Here, the most
prominent assessment of state capacity is the Fragile State Index (FSI) (formerly
named the Failed State Index) developed by the Fund for Peace and published
annually since 2005. The target audience of the FSI is the international policymaking
community, with the explicit aim of providing policymakers with a reliable tool to
anticipate and assess problems of ‘stateness’, and to therefore serve as a ‘ﬁrst step in
devising strategies for strengthening weak and failing states’.58
The Fund for Peace’s global index quantiﬁes the vulnerability of states to
collapse or conﬂict, and ranks and classiﬁes their performance on the basis of
53 See Charles T. Call, ‘The fallacy of the failed state’, Third World Quarterly, 29:8 (2008), pp. 1491–507;
Homolar, ‘Rebels without a conscience’, pp. 719–20; UN, ‘World Summit Outcome’ (2005), paras 138–9,
available at: {www.unrol.org/ﬁles/2005%20World%20Summit%20Outcome.pdf} accessed 5 August
2014; United Nations Security Council (UNSC), ‘Resolution 1674’ (28 April 2006), available at:
{www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Civilians
%20SRES1674.pdf} accessed 25 August 2014; UNSC, ‘Resolution 1894’ (11 November 2009), available
at: {www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/POC
%20SRES1894.pdf} accessed 25 August 2014.
54 Marina Ottoway and Stefan Mair, ‘States at risk and failed states: Putting security ﬁrst’, Policy Outlook
(Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, September 2004), p. 6, available at: {www.swp-berlin.org/
ﬁleadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/statesatrisk_ks.pdf} accessed 5 August 2014.
55 Nate Haken and Patricia Taft, The Dark Side of State Building: South Sudan (Fund for Peace, 2013),
available at: {http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi13} accessed 1 August 2014.
56 G. John Ikenberry and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Forging a World of Liberty Under Law, U.S. National
Security in the 21st Century’, Princeton Project Papers (Final Report 2006), p. 26; Alexandra Homolar-
Riechmann, ‘The moral purpose of US power: Neoconservatism in the age of Obama’, Contemporary
Politics, 15:2 (2009), pp. 179–96 (pp. 190–1); also US White House, The National Security Strategy of the
United States (Washington, DC, 2002), p. 1; Ban Ki-moon, ‘UN Secretary-General Report on
“Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response”’ (2012), available at: {http://responsibilityto
protect.org/index.php/component/content/article/176-the-un-and-rtop/4315-un-secretary-general-releases-
report-on-responsibility-to-protect-timely-and-decisive-response} accessed 2 June 2014; ICISS, The
Responsibility to Protect.
57 Ottoway and Mair, ‘States at risk’, p. 2.
58 Ibid.
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these measures.59 The FSI bases the rank order of individual states on the total scores
of 12 primary indicators across 3 dimensions – social, economic, and political – which
are each broken down into an average of 14 further sub-indicators. Each of the
primary indicators is an aggregate measure, which rates a particular aspect of state
performance on a scale from 0 for the lowest intensity (most stable) to 10 for the
highest intensity (least stable). The ﬁnal aggregate score achieved by a state in the
overall composite index is the sum of all 12 primary indicators. State performance is
then benchmarked via a scale of possible scores from 0 to 120. This is in turn divided
into four zones of vulnerability: ‘sustainable’ (0 to 29.9), ‘monitoring’ (between 30 and
59.9), ‘warning’ (between 60 and 89.9), and ‘alert’ (between 90 and 120). The complex
and quantitative nature of the FSI aims to signal scientiﬁc rigour and to convey an
aura of objectivity of the rankings and ratings produced. The focus is nonetheless on
judging state viability at the design level of policies and institutions against liberal
norms of good governance and legitimate statehood. This includes evaluating the level
of democracy, the quality of healthcare provision, the degree of political participation,
and the characteristics of electoral processes, as well as the presence of political
freedoms and civil liberties.60
The adherence to liberal norms of legitimate statehood helps to explain the utility
of the Fragile State Index within a wider discourse on humanitarian governance.
Moreover, many of the primary and secondary indicators used to construct the index
map onto the components of human security outlined in the 1994 Human
Development Report and its list of pointers for the risk of national breakdown.61
For example, the primary indicator ‘poverty and economic decline’ is used to assess
the level of economic security in a country through the lens of the ability of the state
to provide for its population, and includes measurements such as GDP growth, GDP
per capita, government deﬁcits, and unemployment rates.62 The underlying
assumption here is that poverty and economic decline automatically have a
negative impact on the ability of the state to provide for its citizens and increases
tensions between the wealthy and the poor. The design of the FSI also makes it
possible to assess the capacity of states to serve the needs of their populations in
the categories of food security and health security. The ‘mounting demographic
pressures’ indicator as a key marker of state vulnerability in the social dimension
includes measurements related to diseases, mortality, and water scarcity, as well as
malnutrition and food scarcity. Measurements related to water and sanitation,
healthcare, and infrastructure, in turn, are an integral part of the ‘progressive
deterioration of public services’ indicator in the political dimension of the FSI.63 In its
explanation for the recent renaming of the FSI from ‘Failed State Index’ to ‘Fragile
State Index’, the Fund for Peace has made the link to the human security agenda
explicit, suggesting that the goal ‘has always been to help improve human security in
countries all over the world’. The index, the Fund argues, is created precisely to help
set policy priorities and to foster the responsibility of governments in improving
livelihoods.64
59 The discussion of the FSI indicators is based on information provided by the Fund for Peace 2014
available at: {http://ffp.statesindex.org/} accessed 25 August 2014.
60 Fund for Peace, ‘Indicators’, available at: {http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators} accessed 5 August 2014.
61 UNDP, HDR 1994, pp. 32–40.
62 Fund for Peace, ‘Indicators’.
63 Ibid.
64 Fund for Peace, ‘Name Change’, available at: {http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi14-namechange}
accessed 25 August 2014.
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The most widely recognised global comparison of whether the institutional designs
of states empower or repress their constituents with respect to political rights and civil
liberties is much older than the concept of human security itself. Freedom in the World
(FIW) is a comparative assessment in the form of a state-centric composite index that
has been produced by the US-based think tank Freedom House since 1972. It is
derived from data generated through the organisation’s Freedom in the World Survey
(previously named the Comparative Survey of Freedom). The aim of this annual
exercise is to measure and rank the degree of freedom – or democracy for that matter –
as experienced by individuals in different countries across the globe. In contrast to legal
guarantees of liberty enacted by governments, these ‘experiences’ are understood by the
FIW in terms of ‘real-world’ rights and freedoms, or de facto rather than simply de jure
rights.65 While many of the FIW components overlap with the FSI indicators, the
former centre more explicitly on questions of political rights and civil liberties, which
are integral to the political component of human security agenda.
Freedom in the World applies normative standards derived from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to rank all countries (as well as some disputed and
dependent territories).66 This is based on their performance across two complex
composite indicators, political rights and civil liberties, in order to establish the degree
of political freedom and civil liberties that individuals enjoy in each country (or not).
These liberties are deﬁned as universal standards that apply ‘irrespective of
geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic
development’. They include, for example, measuring the degree of individual rights,
freedom of expression, and the rule of law for the civil liberties indicator, as well as
political participation, organisational rights, and the functioning of the government
for the political rights indicator. In-house and external analysts from a variety of
expert community backgrounds undertake the FIW evaluation and assess countries’
performance on the basis of a set of pre-deﬁned questions for each of the secondary
indicators. The sources on which this assessment is based vary signiﬁcantly, and
include news media reports, academic studies, and publications from civil society
watchdogs and other non-governmental organisations as well as from individual
professional contacts.
FIW uses a three-tiered assessment system of assigning scores, ratings, and a status
for each of the two primary indicators. These in turn consist of a total of twenty-ﬁve
secondary indicators – ten for the political rights dimension across three subcategories
and ﬁfteen for civil liberties dimension across four subcategories – as well as two
discretionary political rights questions. A country receives a score for each of the
twenty-ﬁve secondary indicators by individual analysts awarding points on a scale
from 0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree). On the basis of the total
scores that a country or territory receives in the ﬁrst step, it is then assigned two
ratings – one for political rights and one for civil liberties on a scale from 7 (smallest
degree) to 1 (greatest degree). In the ﬁnal step, the unweighted average is calculated
from the political rights and civil liberties ratings, on the basis of which countries are
awarded one status on a nominal scale from 1 to 7 that consists of three categories:
free (1.0 to 2.5); partly free (3.0 to 5.0); and not free (5.5 to 7.0). This is the overall
‘Freedom Rating’ produced within the remits of the FIW, and it is widely used by
65 Freedom House, ‘Methodology Fact Sheet’, available at: {www.freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-
fact-sheet#.U_3uNkiPL-m} accessed 25 August 2014. See also {www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-
world-2014/methodology#.VBVmT2Nvxjd} accessed 1 September 1014.
66 This discussion of methodology is based on ibid.
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policymakers and researchers to make judgements about the degree of freedom and
democracy in countries across the globe.
Despite its longstanding popularity, FIW has a large number of well-known
methodological problems.67 A major issue is the lack in transparency of the coding
process, which affects the reliability of the ratings produced and their replicability. It
remains unclear, for instance, which kind of answers to the questions on the FIW
checklist are translated by the analysts into what measures on the individual scales,
and what the underlying theoretical basis is for this relationship between responses
and measures. In addition, the source material is not clearly identiﬁed, contains
subjective observations, and mixes assessments from different issue areas without the
speciﬁcation of their relevance to the FIW ratings. The disaggregated datasets that
underlie the ratings produced in the FIW survey are also not easily accessible to
researchers outside Freedom House.68 Besides a normative bias that privileges
systems of social organisation based on modern Western understandings of justice,
liberty, freedom, and self-determination, this raises questions about the subjectivity of
the scores assigned and the lack of rigour in the data compilation process.
Many aspects of the capacity-benchmarking done by the Fragile State Index
and Freedom in the World play an important role in reinforcing the legitimacy of
status quo international standards of conduct, institutional design, and policy
implementation for states to achieve human security. This includes the principles
of good governance, the rule of law, bureaucratic competence, and optimal
socioeconomic infrastructure. The FSI and FIW have received sustained scholarly
criticism that centres on questioning their methodology, including the principles of
replicability and comparability, as well as the operationalisation of the primary and
secondary indicators.69 While the FIW has begun to address some of these issues and
data has become more accessible and transparent, the FSI methodology remains
opaque. The status of both indices as ‘reputable’ global benchmarks across a wide
range of policy audiences nonetheless largely persists. The credibility of the country
rankings produced by the FSI and FIW with third-party users is primarily rooted in
their ability to provide international actors with an information shortcut to judge how
well states measure up against the benchmark of stability and freedom, and as such
feature prominently in contemporary discourses of human security.
Capability benchmarking: Human development goalposts
While the rankings produced in capacity benchmarking are frequently linked to key
components of the human security agenda, the main global index used to measure
67 See detailed Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, ‘Conceptualizing and measuring democracy:
Evaluating alternative indices’, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Comparative Political
Studies, 35:1 (2002), pp. 5–34; Diego Giannone, ‘Political and ideological aspects in the measurement of
democracy: the Freedom House case’, Democratization, 17:1 (2010), pp. 68–97.
68 Recent subcategory scores and aggregates scores have now been made available at: {www.freedomhouse.
org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores#.VBVmKWNvxjd} accessed 14 September
2014.
69 See Raymond Duncan Gastil, ‘The comparative survey of freedom: Experiences and suggestions’, in Alex
Inkles (ed.), On Measuring Democracy: Its Consequences and Concomitants (New Brunswick and
London: Transaction, 1991); Munck and Verkuilen, ‘Conceptualizing and measuring democracy’; Axel
Hadenius and Jan Teorell, ‘Assessing alternative indices of democracy’, Committee on Concepts and
Methods Working Paper Series, Political Concepts, 6 (2005), available at: {www.concepts-methods.org/
Files/WorkingPaper/PC%206%20Hadenius%20Teorell.pdf} accessed 5 August 2014; Lars Carlsen and
Rainer Bruggemann, ‘The “Failed State Index” offers Morethan just a simple ranking’, Social Indicators
Research, 115 (2014), pp. 525–30.
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human security through a focus on individual capabilities (what humans can do and be)
laid the groundwork for the development of the concept of human security itself.
The Human Development Index (HDI), created by the economists behind the
landmark 1994 HDR, Mahbub ul Haq and the Amartya Sen, was presented as a new
way of measuring development beyond a focus on state-centric aggregate measures of
economic growth and economic means. Introduced in the ﬁrst Human Development
Report in 1990 – and further reﬁned methodologically in the 1991 HDR and
conceptually in the landmark 1994 Report70 – the HDI has since become the primary
comparative quantitative assessment of the state of human development worldwide.
Its utility for global humanitarian governance lies in the HDI’s aim to enable
judgements on a multidimensional understanding of human security through the lens
of the width of peoples’ choices and the level of their achieved wellbeing.71
The Human Development Index seeks to assess progress in human development
across three dimensions that are conceptually underpinned by a capability-based
approach to poverty, which emphasises the importance of individual agency for
development and wellbeing.72 These dimensions include: (1) a long and healthy life;
(2) access to knowledge; and (3) a decent standard of living. Each of these three
dimensions of human development is organised into an index based on a wider set of
indicators, such as life expectancy, education enrolment, and GNI per capita. The
three areas of health, education, and income were identiﬁed in the 1990 Human
Development Report as both the ‘most critical’ measurable development
achievements and essential elements of human life – with political freedoms and
guaranteed human rights seen as additional rather than core routes towards
improving people’s choices.73
For each dimension, the HDI develops a scale of extreme values by deﬁning a
maximum (which was previously the highest observed value in a time series and is
now a value capped at a particular point) and a minimum (a subjectively ﬁxed
subsistence value, which is seen the basic requirements for a society to survive over
time).74 Each country is then assigned a value between 0 and 1 in relation to the
‘goalposts’ marking the high and low end of the human development scale. The value
for each sub-index is calculated by abstracting the minimum value from the actually
observed value of a measurement. The outcome is then divided by the result of
abstracting the minimum value from the maximum value. The HDI value for a
country is the geometric mean of the constituent indexes created for the three
dimensions centred on different quality-of-life attributes, equally weighted. Following
this process of quantiﬁcation, which methodologically privileges values that are
subjectively set over those that are observed, countries are ranked and categorised on
70 UNDP, Human Development Report (HDR) 1990 (Oxford and London: Oxford University Press 1990),
available at: {http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/ﬁles/reports/219/hdr_1990_en_complete_nostats.pdf} accessed
5 August 2014); UNDP, HDR 1994, ch. 5.
71 Ibid., p. 10.
72 See Amartya K. Sen, ‘Well-being, agency and freedom: the Dewey Lecture 1984’, Journal of Philosophy,
82 (1985), p. 203; UNDP, Human Development Report 2010 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010),
p. 16; also Amartya K. Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992);
Sabina Alkire, ‘The capability approach as a development paradigm’, in Enrica Chiappero-Martinetti (ed.),
Debating Global Society: Reach and Limits of the Capability Approach (Milan: Feltrinelli Foundation,
2009).
73 UNDP, HDR 1990, pp. 10, 12.
74 See UNDP, ‘Human Development Reports: Frequently Asked Questions’, available at: {http://hdr.undp.
org/en/faq-page} and {http://hdr.undp.org/en/faq-page/human-development-index-hdi#t292n52} accessed
25 August 2014.
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an ordinal scale of human development – very high, high, medium, and low.75 Like
the FSI and FIW, the HDI has received strong criticism. In addition to problems with
its methodological soundness, the quality of its underlying data, and problems with
data updating and formula revisions,76 this has included questioning the utility of the
indicators selected to measure the state of the human condition and the basis for the
setting of both indicator goalposts and human development thresholds.77
Over the past two decades, several attempts have been made to overcome some of
the methodological and conceptual problems raised in connection with the HDI. In
terms of relevance to the broad human security agenda, these include notably the
Multidimensional Poverty Index, created jointly by the Oxford Poverty and Human
Development Initiative and the UNDP in 2010 for the Human Development Reports;78
the Generalised Human Development Index, offered by Satya R. Chakravarty;79 as
well as proposals to develop performance metrics speciﬁcally for human security, such
as Gary King and Christopher Murray’s threshold of generalised poverty,80 and David
Hastings’ prototype Human Security Index (HSI).81 However, these alternatives have
not overcome the problem of conceptual operationalisation that has plagued the HDI.
In all of these cases, indicators have been selected and operationalised on the basis of
their apparent conceptual intuitiveness and readily available data, often in the form of
complex aggregated datasets.
In the absence of a widely-accepted alternative, the HDI has remained the key global
measure used to evaluate the living standards of a country’s population in the wider
human security discourse through the lens of how well individual states perform and
what they have achieved with respect to the select goalposts identiﬁed in the individual
indicators. The focus in the HDI on the pursuit of development – understood as leading
a long and healthy life, acquiring formal educational qualiﬁcations, and gaining a decent
income – implies a move away from a sensitivity to spatial and cultural differences in
conceiving what it is that makes a life valuable, which was a marker of the capabilities-
based approach to global humanitarian governance from which the HDI emerged.82
75 The thresholds set in the 2013 HDR are now relative, with country classiﬁcations based on HDI
quartiles. See detailed: UNDP, ‘Technical Notes’ (2013), available at: {http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/
ﬁles/hdr_2013_en_technotes.pdf} accessed 5 August 2014.
76 Hendrik Wolff, Howard Chong, and Maximillian Auffhammer, ‘Classiﬁcation, detection and
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(2011), pp. 289–314. The 2013 MPI is available at {www.ophi.org.uk/global-multidimensional-poverty-
index-mpi-2013/} accessed 25 August 2014.
79 Satya R. Chakravarty, ‘A generalized human development index’, Review of Development Economics, 7:1
(2003), pp. 99–114.
80 King and Murray, ‘Rethinking human security’, pp. 590, 606; cf. Taylor Owen, ‘Human security –
conﬂict, critique and consensus: Colloquium remarks and a proposal for a threshold-based deﬁnition’,
Security Dialogue, 35:3 (2004), pp. 345–87.
81 David Hastings, ‘The human security index: Potential roles for the environmental and Earth observation
communities’, Earthzine (May 2011) available at: {www.earthzine.org/2011/05/04/the-human-security-
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While there were initial disagreements between the HDI architects over the reduction of
complex human capabilities to only three main indicators, these were set aside to create
a comparative measure of human development with GDP-like traction.83
Although the HDI provides measures intimately related to core components of the
human security agenda, the UNDP has begun to distance itself from the concept.
Since the early 2000s, the framing of policy priorities in the UNDP’s Human
Development Reports, which contain the HDI and discuss related policy priorities,
has devoted less attention to human security components. Instead it has reﬂected the
UN’s tendency over the past decade to subsume these within ‘threat clusters’ to enable
the adaptation of the concept and related development goals to the post 9/11 security
environment.84 With the twentieth anniversary of the concept of human security in
2014, the UNDP acknowledged that the HDI cannot measure human security, and
recognised that the concept of human security has lost its some of its initial utility in
capturing human vulnerability through the way it has been used in scholarly and
political discourses on global humanitarian governance.85
While the focus on a holistic and capabilities-oriented approach to improving
human lives and achieving human progress has remained at the centre of the UNDP’s
agenda, it is now dominated by the language of shocks and threats to human
development, including economic risks, inequality, health risks, environmental and
natural disasters, food insecurity, and physical insecurity.86 Although these categories
map onto the human security concept introduced two decades ago and reafﬁrm the
focus on states’ capacities to ‘empower and protect people’,87 the UNDP has initiated
a major rhetorical shift toward the dichotomy of resilience/vulnerability.88 This
echoes a broader move to recast human security in terms of ‘resilience’ in (inter)
national security discourse.89
The multiplier effects of global indices
Claims about the condition of human security tend to be based on state-centric
measures of economic growth, development, good governance, and legitimate
statehood. As we have seen, this pattern applies regardless of whether these
measures are based on capacity-benchmarking or capability-benchmarking. While
human security is sometimes seen as a component of human wellbeing and sometimes
approach: a limit to Martha Nussbaum’s universalist ethics’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 33:6
(2009), pp. 1135–52.
83 See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, ‘The human development paradigm: Operationalizing Sen’s ideas on
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human development concept from the HDI – reﬂections on a new agenda’, in Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and
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84 United Nations (UN), ‘AMore Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ (2004), available at: {www.un.
org/en/peacebuilding/pdf/historical/hlp_more_secure_world.pdf} accessed 5 August 2014; see also UN,
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87 UNDP, HDR 2014, p. 5.
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(New York: UNDP, 2011).
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as the meta-concept,90 in conjunction the global indices used to assess the degree of
human security enable international actors to make quantiﬁed connections between
vulnerability, underdevelopment, the lack of state capacity, and security. Various
practices of benchmarking human security have served to correlate a lack of human
development with threats to international peace and stability, in the form of the
security-development nexus, the poverty-security nexus, the link between state
capacity and security, and the identiﬁcation of violent conﬂict as a barrier to
development, and fostered the translation of such narratives of causation into policy
agendas.91 Yet despite the inﬂuence of the human security agenda on the evolution of
the security discourse over the past two decades, the responsibility for addressing
problems of ‘insecurity’ has remained ﬁrmly anchored in the state.92
The global indices used in capacity-benchmarking and capability-benchmarking
to permit quantiﬁable inferences and comparative assessments about the state of
human vulnerability serve both as key transnational advocacy tools for the
monitoring agents that produce them and as data sources for policy activism and
political science research. Indeed, the ability to measure can be seen as the symbolic
capital of the ﬁeld of global humanitarian governance. The attractiveness of reducing
the complex web of challenges to human security into numbers lies in delivering easy-
to-digest data chunks that can be acted upon, as well as in the perception of indices as
‘efﬁcient, consistent, transparent, scientiﬁc, and impartial’.93 Through processes of
measurement, counting, and calculation, performance metrics of human security that
are derived from prominent global indices are perceived to carry a high degree
of objectivity, and this can lend authority to actors who may have very little of
their own.94
Benchmarking human security through global indices does not just conceal the
ambiguous nature of the concepts and theories that these rankings are based on. It
also multiplies the problems associated with making complex phenomena observable
through their conversion into indicators, in particular the oversimpliﬁcation of the
phenomenon being measured and brushing over the norms and values that the
indicator itself contains.95 In this regard, the goal of international comparability is
prioritised above contextual validity and accuracy. As ‘composite indices’, these
global ratings are based on complex datasets that include numerous other indicators –
often mixing different levels of measurement, as well as applying competing
methodologies and data sources – which are aggregated into more encompassing
indices. What is measured in global indices, how this is done, and which measures are
conceptualised as indicators may appear as objective and apolitical analysis, but
remains highly value-laden and subjective.96
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The practice of benchmarking human security reinforces dominant understandings
of what responsible states do, what they look like, and the criteria on which they should
be judged. In this respect, benchmarking human security indirectly serves as a global
standard-setting instrument. It not only permits international political actors to make
symbolic judgements about state performance across a wide range of issue areas that
are intrinsically value-laden but have all the appearance of being value-neutral, but it
also furnishes a persuasive rationale for international intervention to foster acceptance
of and, ultimately, adherence to those standards. Benchmarking human security thus
facilitates international policy interventions to reduce human vulnerability, which are
based on a moral evaluation of states’ performance, while masquerading as an objective
and value-neutral practice.
Conclusion: Governing humans at a distance
This article has shown that the concept of human security as a whole and its core
dimensions are hard to unpack into clear-cut indicators. The establishment of a
threshold that separates ‘secure’ human beings from those who are ‘insecure’ in the
different categories of human security has remained equally elusive. What human
security is has largely been deﬁned by pointing to situations of widely recognised
human vulnerability and suffering. We understand the idea of human security only in
the abstract, as the binary opposite of an egregious lack of security. This enables
external policy interventions in countries’ domestic affairs to be justiﬁed with
reference to the human security agenda and the norms that are integral to it without a
clear articulation of what the particular goals of such actions should be, or how they
can be achieved through such interventions.97
Contemporary political and academic debates on human security have thus far
failed to closely examine the concept in light of global benchmarking practices and
the normative assumptions about ‘human-ness’ upon which they rest. Such an
examination helps to reveal that the ‘human’ at the centre of global humanitarian
governance is not simply a biological fact.98 Indeed, a signiﬁcant part of the history of
the notion of humanity – and humanitarianism as its practical extension – is marked
by attempts to conceptualise the essence of desirable human attributes. While both the
core of what it means to be ‘human’ and what the markers are for a liveable life have
always remained subject to change over time, the social construction of the civilised
‘human’ has typically centred around high levels of education, culture, and status
across different societies, which has often been linked to processes of inclusion
and exclusion.99
The human security agenda does not escape this political dynamic of inclusion and
exclusion. The global indicators and benchmarks chosen to make judgements about
the state of human security reﬂect and reproduce a series of normative assumptions
about what constitutes a ‘secure’ human life, while excluding alternative attributes
that lie outside the limits of this normative framework. Expressed as measurable
97 Christopher J. Finlay, ‘How to do things with the word “terrorist”’, Review of International Studies, 35:4
(2009), pp. 751–74.
98 See Michael N. Barnett, ‘Humanitarian governance’, Annual Review of Political Science, 16:1 (2013),
pp. 379–98 (p. 385); Kyle Grayson, ‘The biopolitics of human security’, Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, 21:3 (2008), pp. 383–401.
99 Detailed in Costas Douzinas, ‘The many faces of humanitarianism’, Parrhesia, 2 (2007), pp. 1–28 (pp. 1–5);
on the polarization of ‘humanity’, see Ikechi Mgbeoji, ‘The civilized self and the barbaric other: Imperial
delusions and the challenges of human security’, Third World Quarterly, 27:5 (2006), pp. 855–69.
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indicators, the essentialism embedded within the practice of benchmarking human
security and the wider human security discourse has not only involved developing a
model for what it means to be secure (or not), but also setting standards for a ‘good’
human life. This has helped to establish the criteria by which what is found to be
normal in a statistical sense also becomes normal in a moral sense.100 Within this
context, the practice of benchmarking human security functions as a symbolic
judgement on the quality of countries’ conduct, capacities, and institutional design.
Because those states that are judged to be underperformers become the focal point of
international policy agendas, benchmarking human security functions as an indirect
strategy of governance to remake the state at a distance.
Much of the political power of human security indicators and benchmarks rests on
their dual role in global governance discourses. On the one hand, they serve to
underwrite legitimation claims by international political actors in pursuit of speciﬁc
policy agendas to change state behaviour. On the other, they act as an ‘authorising
force’ in the creation of international legal standards, such as the emerging norm of
the ‘responsibility to protect’.101 The goal of improving human life is thereby reduced
to a narrow range of categories and indicators that are deﬁned at the outset as core
dimensions of human security. While the human security label has been invested with
political power precisely because its meaning and scope remain contested, the power
of benchmarking human security is the capacity to shape, normalise, and naturalise a
particular understanding of what makes human life ‘secure’, while at the same time
obscuring the power relations and political normativity that this conception of a
secure human life contains. It is the power to identify, in the deceptively neutral
language of technocratic assessment, the where, what, and how of international policy
interventions in the name of securing humans.
100 Detailed Ian Hacking, The Taming of Chance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
101 On ‘authorizing force’, see Habermas’s discussion of Hanna Arendt’s conception of political power.
Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy, trans. William Rheg (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 148.
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